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I. INTRODUCTION 
States, people, organizations, and economies are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the Internet to conduct their everyday affairs. Despite this ever-
increasing cyber dependence, a small number of privately-owned submarine 
cables—that are remarkably vulnerable to damage—are responsible for the 
transmission of almost all internet communications.1 The criticality of these 
cables, along with advances in submarine military technology, give rise to 
the possibility that a state may attack the cables providing 
telecommunications access to another state in order to deny that state, 
businesses, and people access to the Internet. In the event that a state does 
conduct such an attack on submarine cables, the victim state and 
international community at large will need to urgently consider whether such 
an attack constitutes an armed attack, which would justify the use of force in 
self-defense, and, if so, what use of force in defense is legal. 
Part II of this paper summarizes the criticality of the Internet to modern 
society, while Part III describes the international submarine cable network 
and its vulnerability. Part IV sets out the modern legal framework for 
analyzing uses of force under international law. Part V analyzes whether an 
attack on submarine cables would constitute an armed attack justifying the 
use of force in self-defense, considering both attribution and the severity of 
the consequences of the attack.2 Part VI discusses what uses of force in self-
defense would be appropriate then follows, with regard to necessity, 
proportionality and the legitimacy of targets. 
Part VII concludes that some attacks by states on submarine cables 
could foreseeably amount to an armed attack that would justify the use of 
force in self-defense. Such an attack will meet this threshold if it causes a 
severe reduction in a state’s access to the Internet and other 
telecommunications for a substantial period of time, which is highly-fact 
specific. In addition, states exercising their right to self-defense must be 
cautious of a range of factors that could render their use of force illegal. In 
particular, they must be able to satisfy requirements of necessity, 





 1.  This paper focuses only on submarine communications cables and not submarine power cables. 
 2.  This paper does not address the separate (and similarly pressing) issue of the legality of 
wiretapping submarine cables. For a discussion of this (possibly already-realized) threat, see Tara 
Davenport, Submarine Cables, Cybersecurity and International Law: An Intersectional Analysis, 24 
CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 57 (2015). 
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II. THE CRITICALITY OF THE INTERNET AND SUBMARINE 
CABLES 
Since the invention of the World Wide Web in 1989,3 and particularly 
since the mid-to-late 2000s, the Internet has revolutionized modern life. An 
estimated 4.1 billion people now use the Internet, with the number of users 
having grown by an average of ten percent each year since 2005.4 In 
developed countries, 86.6% of people use the Internet, while 47.0% of 
people in developing countries use the Internet.5 Demand for bandwidth is 
predicted to increase almost twofold biennially for the foreseeable future.6 
Despite the Internet’s crucial role in modern life, little attention is paid 
to how communications are actually transmitted through the Internet7—that 
is, not how internet service providers connect computers and smartphones to 
the Internet through Wi-Fi and phone data plans, but rather how information 
is thereafter communicated around the world.8 In fact, submarine cables—
not satellites—carry ninety-nine percent of the world’s international 
telecommunications.9 The preeminence of cables is due to the fact that they 
can transmit much more data at a much lower cost than satellites.10 
Not only individuals rely on the Internet—businesses and states’ 
economies do, too. Globalization has caused the integration of states’ 
economies and their subsequent interdependence, with businesses using 
email and international phone calls to communicate with overseas parties. In 
international finance, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication uses the global submarine cable network for data 
transmissions between financial institutions in over 200 countries and 
territories.11 Those transmissions averaged 34.18 million per day in 
 
 3.  History of the Web, WORLD WIDE WEB FOUND., https://webfoundation.org/about/vision/ 
history-of-the-web (last visited Dec. 12, 2019). 
 4.  INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, MEASURING DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT: FACTS AND FIGURES 2019 1 
(2019). 
 5.  Id. at 2. 
 6.  SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., SUBMARINE TELECOMS INDUSTRY REPORT 19/20 15 
(Stephen Nielsen ed.) (2019). 
 7.  See Adam Satariano, How the Internet Travels Across Oceans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/10/technology/internet-cables-oceans.html (“People think 
that data is in the cloud, but it’s not,’ said Jayne Stowell, who oversees construction of Google’s undersea 
cable projects. ‘It’s in the ocean.’”). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., supra note 6, at 14. For a primer on the development of 
the global submarine communications cable network, see Davenport, supra note 2, at 60–62. 
 10.  See Submarine Cable Frequently Asked Questions, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://www2.tele 
geography.com/submarine-cable-faqs-frequently-asked-questions#Cable-101 (last visited Nov. 26, 
2019) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. 
 11.  About Us, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us (last visited Dec. 12, 2019). 
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September 2019 (bringing year-to-date growth to 7.5%).12 As Chief 
Executive Eric Handa of APTelecom recently summarized, “[s]ubmarine 
[c]able capacity for reasons of diversity in avoiding points of failure and 
‘enabling always on’ networks is critical for banking and finance, aviation, 
and various other industries that utilize cloud computing, artificial 
intelligence, and are poised to seize on the upcoming 4th Industrial 
Revolution of automation.”13 
States also rely on submarine cables for their international 
communications, including for national security, as the radiofrequency 
circuits that satellites use have insufficient bandwidth for the operational 
orders necessary for global military operations.14 Accordingly, states use the 
cable network for military operations, diplomatic missions, and intelligence-
gathering.15 Although the United States has laid submarine cables solely for 
national security purposes,16 this appears to be a novel concept.17 For 
example, the lack of exclusively national security related submarine cables 
between Egypt and Italy caused U.S. Air Force disruptions in 2008.18 Three 
of the world’s largest submarine cables (between Egypt and Italy) were 
damaged, causing a reduction in connectivity between Europe and the 
Middle East of eighty percent.19 This disruption meant that the U.S. Air 
Force could only launch tens of drone flights per day from Balad Air Base 
in Iraq, instead of the usual hundreds.20 
For the reasons stated in this section, the submarine cable network is 
increasingly being labelled as “critical infrastructure”21—a classification that 
reflects its profound significance to modern life. 
 
 12.  SWIFT  IN  FIGURES Sept. 2019 YTD, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/sites/default/files/ 
documents/sif_201909.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2019). 
 13.  SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., supra note 6, at 12. 
 14.  Bryan Clark, Undersea Cables and the Future of Submarine Competition, 72 BULL. ATOMIC 
SCIENTISTS 234, 235 (2016). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See Garrett Hinck, Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables, LAWFARE (Mar. 5, 
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-russian-threat-undersea-cables (referring to 
the Pentagon’s admission that it had laid a cable connecting Miami, Florida with Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
and was planning a second cable connecting Guantanamo Bay to Puerto Rico). 
 17.  Rishi Sunak, UNDERSEA CABLES: INDISPENSABLE, INSECURE 8 (2017). 
 18.  Id. at 21–22. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See generally, e.g., Doug Brake, SUBMARINE CABLES: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR 
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (2019) (highlighting increased demand and use of submarine cables). 
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III. THE VULNERABILITY OF SUBMARINE CABLES 
Given the criticality of the submarine cable network, it is reasonable to 
expect that submarine cables could be targeted for malicious purposes. 
Despite their significance, however, they are highly vulnerable due to the 
characteristics of the cable network and the cables themselves.22 
Submarine cables generally have a girth similar to that of a garden hose 
and are simply laid along the seabed (although they are typically buried 
beneath the seabed close to shore).23 Their locations are easily accessible on 
the Internet24 and they may be easily signposted close to land to caution 
nearby vessels.25 Moreover, they are generally owned by consortia or private 
companies,26 with the effect that states do not have the same direct 
responsibility or ability to protect them than if they were publicly-owned.27 
The fact that there is an average of 100 cable faults each year (i.e., more 
than one quarter of all submarine cables)28 demonstrates submarine cables’ 
vulnerability to physical harm. Dragged anchors caused approximately two-
thirds of faults, with environmental events such as earthquakes also causing 
damage.29 On rarer occasions, aquatic animals have caused damage, such as 
by way of shark bites.30 Due to this vulnerability, then U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton listed dozens of cable landing sites around the world as 
“critical foreign dependencies” in a confidential cable to all U.S. diplomatic 
posts in 2009.31 
Fixing cable faults is usually a lengthy and complicated process.32 The 
owner of the damaged cable must first determine the location of the break 
 
 22.  For an in-depth technical explanation of the vulnerability of the international submarine cable 
network, see generally DNI, THREATS TO UNDERSEA CABLE COMMUNICATIONS (2017). 
 23.  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10. 
 24.  See, e.g., Submarine Cable Map, TELEGEOGRAPHY, https://www.submarinecablemap.com 
(last visited Dec. 9, 2019). 
 25.  This is the case in New Zealand, for example, where the Submarine Cables and Pipelines 
Protection Act 1996, s 12 (N.Z.), has resulted in Orders in Council establishing signposted protected areas 
surrounding coastal cable landing zones. The author has travelled to one such protected area off the Cook 
Strait coast of Marlborough, New Zealand, himself. 
 26.  See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10. For a primer on the submarine cable industry, 
see Davenport, supra note 2, at 65–66. 
 27.  See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 114, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS] (mandating that states should impose liability for damage to cables during the 
laying or repairing of other cables on the owners of those other cables). Brake, supra note 21, at 2. 
 28.  Brake, supra note 21, at 2. 
 29.  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Request for Information: Critical Foreign Dependencies (Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Located Abroad), WIKILEAKS: PUBLIC LIBRARY OF US DIPLOMACY, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE15113_a.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2019). 
 32.  Clark, supra note 14. 
SHEPHERD_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2021  11:42 AM 
204 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:199 
using a built-in monitoring system.33 The owner must then contract cable 
repair ships to attend the site of the damage.34 This can take a considerable 
amount of time for long and remote cables—for example, the damage could 
occur in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, thousands of miles away from the 
nearest repair ship.35 For this reason, although cable faults in the populous 
‘Transatlantic’ region are typically repaired within days or hours, the 
worldwide average repair timeframe was approximately 27 days in 2019, 
while the average for the much more expansive ‘Transpacific’ region was 
longer than all other regions’ averages combined.36 
The evolution of undersea warfare technology compounds the threat to 
the submarine cable network. It is expected that unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs) will replace submarines for offensive missions in the 2020s 
and early 2030s, given that they are smaller and more difficult to detect.37 
The fact that use of a UUV does not directly threaten the life of an officer of 
the offensive state will remove the direct risk to human life inherent to 
offensive missions, along with the decrease in political capital that results 
from the loss of patriotic life.38 Further, developments in undersea 
communication methods are likely to allow submarines, UUVs and onshore 
commanders to communicate without any above-the-surface vehicles or 
facilities.39 
In this context of improving autonomous access to cables, reporters 
documented a significant increase in the activity of Russian submarines and 
spy ships along submarine cable routes as early as October 2015.40 In 
November 2019, Yantar—a Russian intelligence ship that has previously 
been observed “loitering” around cables—was operating near North 
America in the Atlantic Ocean in a manner that was invisible to open-source 
tracking systems.41 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See SUBMARINE TELECOMM. FORUM, INC., supra note 6, at 51. 
 36.  Id. at 49–51. 
 37.  Clark, supra note 14, at 236. 
 38.  See Teresa A. Myers & Andrew F. Hayes, Reframing the Casualties Hypothesis: 
(Mis)Perceptions of Troop Loss and Public Opinion About War, 22 INT’L J. PUB. OP. RES. 256, 257–58 
(2010) (“Wartime casualties reduce the legitimacy and political capital of state leaders across the 
world . . . This lack of legitimacy can then lead to an inability for those leaders to maintain power.”). 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. 
Comfort, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-
presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html. 
 41.  H. I. Sutton, Russia’s Suspected Internet Cable Spy Ship Vanishes Off the Americas, FORBES 
(Dec. 1, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2019/11/19/russias-suspected-internet-
cable-spy-ship-vanishes-off-the-americas/#54da4e8f62c1; see also Hinck, supra note 16. 
SHEPHERD_FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2021  11:42 AM 
2020] CUTTING SUBMARINE CABLES 205 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
This section introduces the sources of international law and their 
hierarchy, before identifying treaty provisions and rules of international 
customary law that set the framework for determining the legality of 
responses to cable attacks. 
A. Sources of International Law 
The sources of international law and their order of primacy are codified 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice of 1945.42 
Those sources, in order, are: international conventions; international custom; 
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;” and “judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of 
law.”43 Although there is no principle of stare decisis in international law 
(International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) judgments are not binding on 
subsequent judgments or non-parties),44 the I.C.J. frequently references its 
previous judgments to promote the consistency of its jurisprudence.45 
B. Relevant Provisions of International Conventions 
No international convention contains any direct provisions regarding an 
attack against a submarine internet cable. Despite cable-related provisions in 
the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables46 and 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea,47 neither convention provides 
for the issue of the use of force in self-defense in response to a cable attack 
by another state.48 The core relevant treaty is therefore the Charter of the 
United Nations of 1945 (the U.N. Charter),49 which revised the law on the 
use of force in response to World War II.50 To that end, Article 2(4) prohibits 
the threat or use of force: 
 
 42.  STAT. INT’L CT. OF JUST. art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at art. 59. 
 45.  Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L 
DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 9 (2011). 
 46.  Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 24 Stat. 989. 
 47.  See UNCLOS, supra note 27, arts. 51, 79, & 112–15. 
 48.  Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, supra note 46, at art. 2; see 
NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE STRATEGY AND LAW BRANCH RESEARCHERS, Strategic 
Importance Of, And Dependence On, Undersea Cables 5  (2019); see also U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, supra note 27, art. 114. 
 49.  U.N. Charter. 
 50.  CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 9–10 (4th ed. 2018). 
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All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.51 
Under Article 39, the U.N. Security Council has the sole right to 
determine “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression.”52 The same provision gives the Security Council—whose 
members include five permanent members holding veto power (the United 
States, United Kingdom, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, 
and France)—the power to decide what measures should be taken in 
response to such threats, breaches or acts.53 However, because of the veto 
power of the five permanent members, Article 39 often does not provide 
states with satisfactory recourse.54 With the Russian Federation’s 
aforementioned scoping of cables, it is foreseeable that a permanent member 
would invoke their veto power in the event of determination of resolutions 
following an attack on submarine cables. As such, Article 51 is relevant. 
Despite the prohibition on the threat or use of force and the U.N. Security 
Council’s sole authority to authorize responses, Article 51 allows a state to 
use self-defense without prior approval in the event of an “armed attack”: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.55 
Unfortunately, the drafters of the U.N. Charter did not define an “armed 
attack.”56 The remainder of the U.N. Charter also provides no contextual 
assistance, as there is no use of the phrase “armed attack” in any other 
provision.57 One must therefore revert to the other sources of international 
law, in accordance with Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute.58 It is important to 
note that although Article 38 of the I.C.J. Statute ranks international custom 
 
 51.  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 52.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  GRAY, supra note 50, at 20 (noting how the U.N. General Assembly—which is more 
representative than the U.N. Security Council—has had to step in to condemn acts of aggression where 
the U.N. Security Council has failed to pass a resolution because of the use, or threat of use, of a veto). 
 55.  U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added). 
 56.  See id. 
 57.  See generally U.N. Charter (lacking the phrase “armed attack” in all but one provision). 
 58.  I.C.J. Statute, supra note 42. 
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and general legal principles higher than I.C.J. judgments and scholarship, it 
is necessary nonetheless to consult the latter two sources to determine 
international custom and general legal principles. 
C. Relevant International Custom and General Legal Principles 
The I.C.J. first considered the invocation of Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.).59 That case centered on allegations that the United States 
executed an armed attack against Nicaragua by supporting the right-wing 
Contras in their armed rebellion against the Government of Nicaragua.60 The 
I.C.J. noted that the U.N. Charter “by no means covers the whole area of the 
regulation of the use of force in international relations.”61 As Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter refers to the “inherent right of self-defense” and states that 
it does not impede that right, the I.C.J. recognized that the right must be 
customary in nature.62 Accordingly, the I.C.J. confirmed that Article 51 
neither “subsumes” nor “supervenes” relevant international customary law 
rules, such as those that self-defense only warrants measures that “are 
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it”63 
The I.C.J. next considered the use of force in Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
U.S.).64 The I.C.J. applied its judgment in Nicaragua, essentially determining 
that the United States needed to prove four elements to justify the legality of 
its retaliatory attacks: firstly, that it had been subject to attacks that Iran was 
responsible for; secondly, that those attacks were of the gravest forms 
constituting an armed attack; thirdly, that its response was necessary and 
proportional; and finally, that the subjects of its response were legitimate 
military targets.65 These elements can be referred to in short as attribution, 
gravity, necessity and proportionality, and legitimacy. Attribution and 
gravity are necessary to establish the right to use self-defense. In addition to 
the right to use self-defense, necessity and proportionality and legitimacy are 
required to establish the legality of self-defense as a response. 
Having deduced the above four-element test for a legal use of force in 
self-defense, it is necessary to consider the law in respect to each of those 
 
 59.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 24 (June 27); see also GRAY, supra note 50, at 125. 
 60.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 18, 20. 
 61.  Id. at 94. 
 62.  Id. (quoting U.N. Charter art. 51). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 38–78 (Nov. 6). 
 65.  Id. at 186–87. 
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four elements and how it would apply in the context of a malicious attack on 
submarine cables. 
V. “ARMED ATTACK”? 
If a state suffers suspicious damage to its submarine cable network, will 
be to determine whether it has been subjected to an “armed attack” for the 
purposes of Article 51. This inquiry encompasses the first two elements 
above: attribution and gravity. If both elements are met, then the state can 
turn to considerations of what use of force in response is justifiable. 
A. Attribution 
Attribution is the first hurdle in proving legal use of force in self-
defense,66 and states have often fallen on it. Essentially, a state wishing to 
use force against another state in self-defense must be able to prove that the 
alleged perpetrator did actually attack the cables.67 In the context of a cable 
attack, a victim state would need to be able to prove two elements: firstly, 
that the cable damage was a deliberate attack, and secondly, that the state it 
wishes to retaliate against was responsible. 
1. Deliberate Attack 
The first element is significant because of the aforementioned 
prolificacy of unintentional cable damage. Most orthodox uses of force, such 
as a missile strike or armed invasion, are obviously deliberate. However, 
while a state with several cables may be prone to assuming that a significant 
outage is the result of a deliberate attack to its cable network, damage to 
cables may have another cause, such as a dragged anchor or earthquake.68 
Consequently, a victim state must be very cautious not to use force in self-
defense as a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction—particularly if it is one of the many well-
connected states whose cables converge at “chokepoints.”69 There are at least 
ten such “chokepoints” worldwide;70 for example, all cables connecting 
 
 66.  See id. 
 67.  See id. at 189 (“The Court does not have to attribute responsibility for firing the missile that 
struck the Sea Isle City, on the basis of a balance of evidence, either to Iran or to Iraq; if at the end of the 
day the evidence available is insufficient to establish that the missile was fired by Iran, then the necessary 
burden of proof has not been discharged by the United States.”). 
 68.  See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 10. 
 69.  See Doug Tsuruoka, How World War III Could Start: Cut the ‘Cable”, NAT’L INT.: THE BUZZ 
(Jan. 7, 2018), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-world-war-iii-could-start-cut-the-cable-
23974 (“Chokepoints where cables converge because of underwater terrain or other factors are especially 
vulnerable.”). 
 70.  Michael Sechrist, New Threats, Old Technology: Vulnerabilities in Undersea Communications 
Cable Network Management Systems 9 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Belfer Ctr. for Sci. & Int’l Affs. Discussion 
Paper No. 2012-03, 2012), https://citizenlab.org/cybernorms2012/sechrist.pdf. 
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Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan converge in the Luzon Strait.71 
Those countries suffered disrupted internet access when an earthquake 
caused six cables to sever at once in 2006.72 Accordingly, a state that suffers 
damage to its submarine cable connections must first establish that it actually 
was the victim of an attack, rather than mere accidental cable damage from 
other causes. 
2. Establishing Responsibility 
If a state is convinced that it is the victim of a cable attack, it must also 
be able to attribute the attack to a particular state before it uses force in self-
defense. The I.C.J. considered responsibility in Oil Platforms and Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda).73 
Oil Platforms centered on events in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988.74 
In 1987, a missile struck a U.S.-flagged oil tanker (Sea Isle City) near Kuwait 
Harbor.75 The United States attributed the attack to Iran.76 Three days later, 
U.S. naval forces destroyed two Iranian offshore oil platforms, asserting self-
defense.77 The next year, the U.S. warship USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a 
mine in international waters off the coast of Bahrain.78 Again, the United 
States attributed the attack to Iran.79 Four days later, the United States 
destroyed two Iranian offshore oil platforms, again asserting self-defense.80 
The United States alleged that those two attacks were part of an Iranian 
campaign responsible for over 200 attacks on neutral shipping in the Persian 
Gulf.81 Iran asserted that Iraq was actually responsible.82 
The I.C.J. held that the United States provided insufficient evidence to 
discharge its burden of proof for attribution,83 failing to prove that Iran was 
 
 71.  Tsuruoka, supra note 69. 
 72.  Id.; see also Asia Communications in Chaos After Earthquake Off Taiwan - Asia - Pacific - 
International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/27/ 
world/asia/27iht-quake.4032404.html (reporting the Asian telecommunication chaos caused by an 
earthquake in Taiwan which damaged undersea cables). 
 73.  See Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 191–92; see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 316 (Dec. 19). 
 74.  Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 175–76. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 176. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See id. at 191–92. 
SHEPHERD_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2021  11:42 AM 
210 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 31:199 
responsible for either the missile attack84 or the laying of the mine.85 
Accordingly, the United States’ attacks on Iranian oil platforms were held to 
be illegal.86 
The I.C.J. considered attribution again two years later in Armed 
Activities.87 The dispute in that case was Uganda was justified in using armed 
force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.) during the Second 
Congo War. Uganda claimed that it had acted in self-defense against cross-
border attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (A.D.F.), a Congolese 
Islamist rebel group.88 The I.C.J. found that there was insufficient evidence 
of D.R.C. support for the A.D.F. to hold the D.R.C. responsible for the cross-
border attacks.89 Moreover, the D.R.C.’s inaction (or ineffective action) to 
prevent the A.D.F.’s attacks could not amount to an “armed attack” by the 
D.R.C.90 
In light of these cases, it is crucial for a victim state to establish 
responsibility for an attack to a particular state in order to justify using force 
against that state in self-defense. This may well be difficult as the 
development of UUVs and other covert seabed warfare technology 
progresses. States would be wise to develop their detection capabilities in 
order to mitigate the risk that the perpetrator of an attack would be 
unidentifiable. 
B. Gravity 
Even if a victim state has sufficient evidence to attribute a malicious 
attack to another state, that alone is insufficient for it to use force in self-
defense. After establishing attribution, a state must then prove that the attack 
reaches the threshold of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter. 
1. Previous Cases 
In Nicaragua, the I.C.J. set an ambiguous test for subsequent 
determinations of armed attacks, which established that not all uses of force 
meet the threshold of an armed attack: “it will be necessary to distinguish the 
most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) 
 
 84.  Id. at 189. 
 85.  Id. at 195–96. 
 86.  Id. at 199. 
 87.  Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 242. See Gray, supra note 50, at 140. 
 88.  See GRAY, supra note 50, at 140. 
 89.  See id. 
 90.  See id. 
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from other less grave forms.”91 In Armed Activities, the I.C.J. dismissed 
Uganda’s argument that this ambiguous threshold of “armed attack” in 
Nicaragua was too narrow.92 However, gravity did not play a controversial 
role in either case. 
In Oil Platforms, the I.C.J. considered whether all of the alleged uses of 
force on U.S.-flagged or U.S.-owned vessels and aircraft in the Persian Gulf 
would have amounted to an armed attack (had they had been attributable to 
Iran).93 Regarding the missile strike on Sea Isle City, the I.C.J. determined 
that, even cumulatively, there was insufficient severity to meet the threshold 
of an armed attack for two reasons.94 Firstly, the missile could not have been 
aimed precisely at the vessel, but only at the Kuwait Harbor generally.95 
Secondly, an attack on a private vessel not flying a state’s flag could not be 
interpreted as an attack on the flag-state.96 In relation to the USS Samuel B. 
Roberts, the I.C.J. declined to determine whether mining a single military 
vessel constituted an armed attack, but did not exclude the possibility that it 
could.97 
2. Application 
The chief executive of international cable telecommunications 
company Seacom, Byron Clatterbuck, is skeptical about the possibility of an 
attack on cable causing a major outage.98 For example, the fact that the 
United Kingdom is connected to more than 50 submarine cables means that 
an attack would need to be executed simultaneously on multiple cables in 
order to be effective.99 Clatterbuck’s point is strong for highly-connected 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States (which is 
connected to approximately 40 cables).100 The difficulty inherent in 
sabotaging a sufficient number of cables to thwart telecommunications 
service means that it is unlikely that such countries would ever suffer an 
attack on their cables of sufficient severity to properly constitute an “armed 
attack.” Additionally, submarine cables normally operate with reserve 
 
 91.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 191. 
 92.  See GRAY, supra note 50, at 139. 
 93.  Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 191. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See id. at 195. 
 98.  James Griffiths, The Global Internet is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re 
Vulnerable, CNN (July 26, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/25/asia/internet-undersea-
cables-intl-hnk/index.html. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See DOUGLAS R. BURNETT & LIONEL CARTER, INTERNATIONAL SUBMARINE CABLES AND 
BIODIVERSITY OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 4 (2017). 
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capacity, so states with a multitude of cables (such as the United Kingdom) 
would be able to simply increase the capacity of their remaining cables in 
the event of an attack.101 Moreover, states with access to other cable systems 
pursuant to mutual restoration agreements can access those in the event of a 
cable fault. Moreover, states with access to other cable systems pursuant to 
mutual restoration agreements can access those in the event of a cable 
fault.102 
However, Clatterbuck’s point is less applicable to smaller countries 
with few submarine cable connections. For example, New Zealand is 
connected to the outside world through five submarine cables, which all land 
in or near Auckland.103 Only two submarine cables connect the South Island 
to the smaller North Island (and consequently the rest of the world).104 It is 
therefore foreseeable that an attack on even one of the submarine cables 
connecting New Zealand would have a significant effect on its 
telecommunications—particularly given that it also has no land borders and 
therefore could not gain alternative telecommunications access through land 
cables in an emergency.105 Furthermore, a coordinated attack on all of its 
cables would be much more achievable, due to there being only five. The 
same would be true for numerous other states—particularly those that are 
small, remote and/or island states (for example, Kiribati is only connected to 
one submarine cable)106 or those with aforementioned “chokepoints.”107 
The effects of a near or total shutdown on a smaller, less well-connected 
state could be catastrophic, with a shutdown lasting for several days or even 
weeks.108 Although there have been some suspected intentional cable attacks 
(by individuals), these mostly occurred in the 2000s.109 Given that usership 
of the Internet is increasing at approximately ten percent annually,110 analysis 
of the effects of the most recent government-enforced domestic internet 
shutdowns provide more assistance in determining the grassroots gravity of 
 
 101.  See SUNAK, supra note 17, at 21 (discussing the spare capacity to reroute cables between the 
United States and United Kingdom in the event of an attack). 
 102.  See Davenport, supra note 2, at 78 (discussing states that use the same network operating 
center). 
 103.  See Submarine Cable Map, supra note 24. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  SUNAK, supra note 17, at 18. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Tsuruoka, supra note 69. 
 108.  Key Actions to Protect Submarine Cables from Criminal Activity Identified at UNODC Global 
Expert Meeting, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/ 
en/frontpage/2019/February/key-actions-to-protect-submarine-cables-from-criminal-activity-identified-
at-unodc-global-expert-meeting.html. 
 109.  See Davenport, supra note 2, at 80–81. 
 110.  INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 4. 
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an internet shutdown. It is important to note, however, that these 
consequences are only relevant to states that would have essentially no 
access to the Internet if their cables were cut. Large states with vital servers 
located there, such as the United States, would not be so affected, as internal 
internet communications would still both function and have utility.111 As 
such, a state such as the United States would likely have difficulty in proving 
sufficient gravity in the absence of a widespread, coordinated attack. 
3. Consequences of Internet Shutdowns 
India is by far the world’s most frequent deployer of domestic internet 
shutdowns, with approximately two-thirds of 2018 shutdowns occurring 
there.112 In early August 2019, the Government of India shut down internet 
and phone service in the then-state of Jammu and Kashmir for at least two 
weeks.113 While Kashmiris were unable to access news media, both houses 
of the Parliament of India passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation 
Act, which demoted the state from full state status to two mere ‘union 
territories’ (Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh).114 Although this denial of 
civil and political rights is distinct to national security concerns, it 
demonstrates the severity of what can be achieved while people are unable 
to mobilize and communicate. In the context of an attack on submarine 
cables, this example highlights the likelihood that a state would be unable to 
effectively mobilize its military reservists and communicate any national 
security threats to other parts of the country. This would be of grave concern 
to any state experiencing a near or total internet shutdown. 
Moreover, such a shutdown would have grave impacts for people. 
Eleven days into the shutdown in Kashmir, The New York Times documented 
that shopkeepers were running short on vital supplies, such as insulin and 
baby food, as they usually ordered them online.115 The shutdown forced 
banks and automated teller machines—which are reliant on the Internet for 
all transactions—to close, causing shortages of cash (which Kashmiris no 
 
 111.  See Louise Matsakis, What Would Really Happen If Russia Attacked Undersea Internet Cables, 
WIRED (Jan. 5, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/russia-undersea-internet-cables/. 
 112.  ACCESS NOW, THE STATE OF INTERNET SHUTDOWNS AROUND THE WORLD 2 (2019). For a 
report on internet shutdowns in India, see generally SOFTWARE FREEDOM LAW CTR., INDIA, LIVING IN 
DIGITAL DARKNESS: A HANDBOOK ON INTERNET SHUTDOWNS IN INDIA (2018). 
 113.  See Vindu Goel et al., India Shut Down Kashmir’s Internet Access. Now, ‘We Cannot Do 
Anything.’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/14/technology/india-
kashmir-internet.html. 
 114.  Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, No. 34, Acts of Parliament, 2019 §§ 3–4 
(India). 
 115.  Goel et al., supra note 113. 
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doubt required to purchase necessary supplies while the shutdown rendered 
card payment unavailable).116 
In Zimbabwe, the government shut down the Internet for six days in 
January 2019.117 The difficulty in making required payments and 
communicating with business partners caused one fuel merchant, for 
example, to lose his contract with a South African supplier.118 This meant 
that he had to make 27 of his 35 workers redundant, close three of his four 
branches and lose 90 percent of his monthly profits.119 People were unable 
to purchase food without a functional electronic payment system.120 
In Sudan, the military junta that assumed governance following the 
2019 Sudanese coup d’état shut down the Internet for an entire month.121 
Doctors were unable to order new medicine, causing a shortage of supplies 
for treatment of diabetic patients.122 Meanwhile, protest leaders in the 
Sudanese Revolution were unable to use WhatsApp to request medical 
assistance.123 
4. Analysis 
In light of the above, a cable attack would have catastrophic effects on 
a state that would endure a near or full internet shutdown for longer than a 
few days. This fact is best stated by Robert Fonow, who summarized the 
consequences that would ensue if a “chokepoint” cable landing site was 
attacked: 
[C]ascading failures could immobilize much of the international 
telecommunications system and Internet for several weeks. The effect on 
international finance, military logistics, medicine, commerce and 
agriculture in a global economy would be profound. A degraded system 
of military logistics would leave troops in the field with less support. The 
international flow of oil and food supplies would be impeded. Chaos in 
the shipping and airline industries would result. The system that supports 
e-mail, Word and Excel file transfers would be gone. Electronic funds 
transfers, credit card transactions and international bank reconciliations 
would slow to a crawl. When apprised of this possibility, a senior official 
 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Patrick Kingsley, Life in an Internet Shutdown: Crossing Borders for Email and Contraband 
SIM Cards, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/world/africa/internet-
shutdown-economy.html. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See id. 
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of The Economist in London suggested that such an event would cause a 
global depression.124 
In this respect, the potentially catastrophic effects of a cable attack are 
much graver than the effects of wiretapping submarine cables, which has 
been perceived to not amount to an “armed attack” for the purposes of Article 
51.125 The key difference is that wiretapping only compromises a state’s 
privacy and creates a risk to national security, whereas a cable attack is an 
actual attack on critical telecommunications infrastructure that has 
immediate effects on a state, its people and its economy. Hence, a cable 
attack is essentially the equivalent of a missile strike on other critical state 
infrastructure, such as energy production plants, as opposed to intelligence-
gathering. It is notable that the authors of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations agreed that a cable attack 
by a state would violate international customary law, whereas wiretapping 
submarine cables is permissible.126 
Despite the I.C.J.’s aforementioned note in Oil Platforms that there 
could not be an armed attack on a private ship not displaying its flag, the fact 
that submarine cables are privately-owned and not flagged to a state does not 
defeat the potential for a cable attack to constitute an armed attack. A state 
executing a cable attack would surely know exactly which state’s or states’ 
connections it was severing.127 Moreover, a strike on one private vessel is 
more likely to be perceived as similar to a “cross-border skirmish” that does 
not amount to an armed attack, due to its effect on only one ship; whereas a 
cable attack is an attack on a state’s critical infrastructure and could affect 
the entire victim state. 
In light of the above, a cable attack will meet the gravity requirement if 
it causes a severe reduction in a state’s access to the Internet and other 
telecommunications for a substantial period of time. A bright-line test is 
inappropriate, however, as circumstances will vary between attacks. 
 
 124.  Robert Fonow, Cybersecurity Demands Physical Security, SIGNAL MAG. (Feb. 2006), 
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=cybersecurity-demands-physical-security. 
 125.  See Davenport, supra note 2, at 101; Pete Barker, The Challenge of Defending Subsea Cables, 
MAR. EXEC. (Mar. 20, 2018, 9:27 AM), https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-challenge-
of-defending-subsea-cables. 
 126.  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 257 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) (“The rules and principles of international law applicable to 
submarine cables apply to submarine communication cables.”). 
 127.  The locations and routes of submarine cables are publicly available. See Submarine Cable Map, 
supra note 24. 
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VI. LEGAL USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE 
A. Necessity & Proportionality 
A state that suffers a sufficiently grave cable attack, that can be 
attributed to another state, will need to quickly determine whether it is 
necessary to use force in self-defense and what level of force is 
proportionate. Although the I.C.J. treats necessity and proportionality 
separately, they are considered together here because the concepts are, in 
practice, entwined.128 
Necessity can be defined as “the requirement that no alternative 
response to an armed attack be possible.”129 Meanwhile, proportionality 
relates “to the size, duration, and target” of the use of force in response.130 
Christine Gray notes that there is consensus among scholars about some 
principles regarding these requirements: “necessity and proportionality mean 
that self-defense must not be retaliatory or punitive; the aim should be to halt 
and repel an attack.”131 Nonetheless, “the defending state is [not] restricted 
to the same weapons or the same numbers of armed forces as the attacking 
state; nor is it necessarily limited to action on its own territory.”132 
1. Previous Cases 
Nonviolent aid will not justify the use of force. Despite finding that the 
United States did have a right to use self-defense under Article 51, the I.C.J. 
still considered necessity and proportionality in Nicaragua.133 Regarding 
necessity, the I.C.J. held that U.S. force against Nicaragua was unnecessary 
to protect the Government of El Salvador because the armed rebellion 
against that government had already been defeated some months prior.134 
Regarding proportionality, it determined that the United States’ response, in 
mining and attacking Nicaraguan ports, was not proportionate to Nicaraguan 
aid for El Salvadorian rebel groups.135 This case clearly establishes that the 
use of force in response to nonviolent aid will not be a proportionate 
response.136 
 
 128.  See GRAY, supra note 50, at 159. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 159–60. 
 133.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 237. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See id. 
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In Oil Platforms, the I.C.J. rejected the necessity of the United States’ 
targeting of oil platforms, as the United States had not complained to Iran of 
military activities on the platforms (whereas it had complained of minelaying 
and attacks on neutral shipping).137 The failure to raise the matter with Iran 
in such a way “does not suggest that the targeting of the platforms was seen 
as a necessary act.”138 The I.C.J. further considered that it was possible that 
the United States’ response to the Sea Isle City attack was proportionate, but 
its response to the USS Samuel B. Roberts striking a mine could not be 
proportionate.139 That was because the mine did not sink the ship and did not 
cause loss of life, whereas the United States’ response destroyed two Iranian 
frigates and several other naval vessels and aircrafts.140 
Armed Activities provides another example of a disproportionate 
response to an armed attack. The I.C.J. observed that “the taking of airports 
and towns many hundreds of kilometers from Uganda’s border would not 
seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given 
rise to the right of self-defense, nor to be necessary to that end.”141 
2. Application 
Necessity could be challenging to satisfy in the event of a cable attack, 
given the practical difficulty that a victim state could face in exhausting 
diplomatic avenues when its means of international communication are 
severely limited. Nevertheless, it would seem counterintuitive to allow an 
aggressor state to claim that diplomatic avenues had not been exhausted, if 
it was responsible for making those avenues impossible to exhaust in the first 
place. It is therefore expected that the concept of necessity could be applied 
with a practical bent in the case of a cable attack. Thus, in the event that 
diplomatic communications are not possible, it is likely that it would be 
permissible for a victim state to neutralize any naval vessels of the aggressor 
state if they posed an imminent threat. 
Separately, in light of the I.C.J.’s finding in Oil Platforms as to 
disparaging human consequences of attacks, a victim state could encounter 
difficulty regarding proportionality if its use of force caused unnecessary 
loss of life. This is because, despite the criticality of the Internet to states, 
their people, and economies, a cable attack alone (without other use of force) 
would likely need to cause several weeks of non-connectivity for any loss of 
life to occur. 
 
 137.  Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 198. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 198–99. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 223. 
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As such, states acting in self-defense must be aware of their duty to 
exhaust all other avenues first (to the extent possible in the absence of 
international telecommunications) and must be very cautious to avoid loss 
of human life and disparaging damage to infrastructure. 
B. A Bona Fide Military Target 
In Oil Platforms, the legitimacy of the United States’ targeting of oil 
platforms was at issue. The parties agreed that Iranian military personnel and 
equipment were present on some of the platforms, but differed as to whether 
Iran’s motive in arranging that was aggressive or defensive.142 The I.C.J. held 
that the United States presented insufficient evidence to support its 
contentions as to the significance of Iran’s military presence and activity on 
the platforms.143 
In light of reports of China and Iran using civilian vessels as quasi-naval 
vessels in the South China Sea and Persian Gulf respectively,144 it is 
foreseeable that an attack on submarine cables might be executed by non-
naval or unflagged ships. In this regard, a relevant principle  is the I.C.J.’s 
determination in Nicaragua that “‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of 
armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter alia) 
an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial 
involvement therein’” can amount to an armed attack.145 
Given the requirement that targets be bona fide military targets, it is 
unlikely that it would be lawful to attack the aggressor state’s submarine 
cables, as they are generally privately-owned and transmit primarily civilian 
and commercial data. Even if the aggressor state owned the cables landing 
there, that would not make them legitimate military targets in the same way 
that other non-military, publicly owned assets, such as public hospitals, 
would not be legitimate military targets. Moreover, cutting submarine cables 
in retaliation would likely cause a loss of bandwidth in third-party countries, 
too. It would also give the aggressor state an offsetting claim in any resulting 
lawsuit for compensation in the I.C.J. 
In conclusion, a victim state with the right to use force in self-defense 
should target only military (or military-instructed) vessels or other 
infrastructure capable of causing further or repeat damage to submarine 
cables. 
 
 142.  Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 161, 196–97. 
 143.  Id. at 198. 
 144.  See SUNAK, supra note 17, at 10. 
 145.  Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 195. 
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C. The Duty to Report 
As a final note, it is important for states to comply with their Article 51 
duty to report the use of force in self-defense to the U.N. Security Council.146 
In Armed Activities, the I.C.J. “observe[d]” that Uganda did not report its 
retaliatory actions in claimed self-defense to the U.N. Security Council.147 
However, the “observation” has been interpreted as the I.C.J. clearly 
implying that this was a factor indicating noncompliance with Article 51.148 
Accordingly, victim states should practice care in reporting to the U.N. 
Security Council as soon as they can transmit communications to their 
diplomatic missions at the United Nations. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Whether or not a state will be daring enough to execute a malicious 
attack on the submarine cable system remains to be seen. Nevertheless, 
states—particularly those with few cables or cable “chokepoints”—would 
be prudent to prepare their defense strategies and legal justifications for the 
unlikely event that such an attack occurs. This is of critical importance, with 
people, economies and national security becoming ever-more dependent on 
the Internet. 
In order to use force in self-defense, a state that suffers from the effects 
of a cable attack will firstly need to prove that the attack was an intentional 
act of another state (as opposed to accidental or environmentally-caused 
damage) and that the alleged state was, in fact, responsible. Secondly, the 
cable attack must cause a severe reduction in the victim state’s access to the 
Internet and other telecommunications for a substantial period of time. 
Anything less would likely be a matter to be resolved through diplomatic 
processes. Only if a victim state can establish these two elements will it be 
able to prove that it has suffered an “armed attack” to which it can respond 
with force in self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
Highly connected states, such as the United States and United 
Kingdom, are unlikely to be able to meet this threshold unless they suffer a 
truly severe attack. Pacific Island states, in comparison, will likely meet this 
threshold in the event that one or a handful of cables are attacked. 
If a victim state establishes the right to self-defense, it may only use 
force if it is necessary and if it does so in a manner that is proportionate to 
the attack(s) it has suffered. Victim states wishing to use force in self-defense 
will need to exercise caution in not acting too hastily (so as to not have 
 
 146.  U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 147.  Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. at 222. 
 148.  GRAY, supra note 50, at 129. 
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exhausted all other options) nor too late (so as to have lost the necessity of 
using force). They will also need to be careful to avoid human casualties, 
given the likelihood that an initial cable attack will not cause casualties. The 
victim state may also attack only legitimate military targets, which would 
likely not include the aggressor state’s submarine cables. 
As a final note, states considering engaging in cable attacks should be 
cognizant of the likelihood that victim states will contend that such attacks 
amount to an “armed attack” pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter—
even if they do not meet the threshold set out above.149 
 
 
 149.  See, e.g., Request for Information: Critical Foreign Dependencies (Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Resources Located Abroad), supra note 31 (indicating the seriousness with which the United States, 
for example—a highly connected country—would likely consider an attack on its “critical 
infrastructure”). 
